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Case No. 890510-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of distribution of 
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989), and of 
distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989), 
in the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Dennis L. 
Draney, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Was the taped phone conversation between defendant 
and a confidential informant properly admitted into evidence at 
trial? 
2. Was a tape recording offered by defendant properly 
excluded from evidence at trial? 
3. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury with 
regard to testimony of the confidential informant? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-4(7)(a) (Supp. 1989)1: 
A person acting under color of law may 
intercept a wire, electronic, or oral 
communication if that person is a party to 
the communication or one of the parties to 
the communication has given prior consent to 
the interception. 
Utah R. Evid. 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Darwin Mecham, was convicted of two counts 
of distribution of a controlled substance after a jury trial (R. 
54, 59). Defendant was sentenced to indeterminate terms at the 
Utah State Prison of zero to five years on the third degree 
felony and one to fifteen years on the second degree felony, said 
sentences to run concurrently (R. 68). Defendant filed his 
notice of appeal on August 8, 1989. 
At trial the tape recording between the confidential informant 
and defendant was received into evidence pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23A-4(2)(H)[sic] (R. 94). That section had been 
superceded by Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-4(7)(a) (Supp. 1989), 
effective April 24, 1989, prior to the trial date of June 23, 
1989. Nevertheless, pursuant to Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, "any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30(a) (1982) (Repealed eff. 
July 1, 1990). The difference between the prior and existing 
statutes are substantively insignificant and do not affect the 
substantial rights of the defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of July 2, 1988, Sgts. Jerry Foote of 
the Duchesne County Sheriff's Office and Wayne Embleton of the 
Roosevelt City Police met Patrick Murphy at the Roosevelt Police 
Station to arrange a marijuana buy from defendant (R. 88). 
Several nights prior to that night Mr. Murphy had been caught by 
Sgt. Foote with some stolen aluminum and offered to help the 
police in exchange for not being prosecuted (R. 88, 103-05, 115). 
On July 2 Mr. Murphy made a phone call to defendant 
from the police station and arranged the marijuana buy. That 
call was tape recorded with Mr. Murphy's knowledge and approval, 
and Sgt. Foote was present during the call (R. 89-90, 113-14, 
140). Defendant, followed and observed by the officers, 
purchased marijuana from defendant (R. 114-17). On July 11, 
1988, Mr. Murphy made another purchase from defendant, with Sgt. 
Foote and Roosevelt Police Chief Cecil Gurr present and observing 
the transaction, this time made in front of Mr. Murphy's home (R. 
148-67). In May, 1989, Mr. Murphy made statements, which were 
recorded by defendant, apparently denying what he had done and 
contradicting his subsequent testimony in court (R. 138, 189-91). 
At trial the court admitted into evidence, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23A-4(2)(H) [sic], the tape of the phone 
conversation between Mr. Murphy and defendant made at the police 
station on July 2nd. Mr. Murphy testified that the tape he made 
in May, 1989 had been made under duress at defendant's request 
after defendant had grabbed him by the throat and threatened him 
(R. 138-39). The trial court refused to admit that tape pursuant 
to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, as being a "waste of time" 
and a "needless presentation of cumulative evidence" (R. 206). 
Defendant requested that an instruction be given to the jury 
urging that Mr. Murphy's testimony, as that of an informant, be 
examined with greater caution than that of an ordinary witness 
(R. 63, 244). The trial court refused to give the requested 
instruction (R. 244). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly admitted into evidence the 
tape recording of the telephone conversation of July 2, 1988, 
between Mr. Murphy and defendant. 
The trial court properly excluded the tape recording 
made in May, 1989 by Mr. Murphy at defendant's request. 
The trial court adequately instructed the jury 
concerning the testimony of Mr. Murphy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE THE TAPE RECORDING OF THE TELEPHONE 
CONVERSATION BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND MR. 
MURPHY. 
Defendant argues that the tape recording of his 
telephone conversation with Mr. Murphy should not have been 
admitted into evidence because a court order had not been 
obtained before the conversation was intercepted (Br. of App. at 
5). However, defendant offers no legal analysis to support his 
contention that a court order was required before intercepting 
the telephone communication between defendant and the 
confidential informant. Although defendant states that the trial 
court should have applied Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-8 and 77-23a-
10 rather than section 77-23a-4(2)(h) [sic] in determining the 
admissibility of the taped telephone conversation, he fails to 
analyze or distinguish the different statutory provisions and 
provides no authority supporting his position. Rule 24(a)(9) of 
both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals states 
that an appellate brief "shall contain the contentions of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented and the reasons 
therefore, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on." In State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court declined to rule on an 
issue because the defendant had "fail[ed] to support his argument 
by any legal analysis or authority." See also State v. Wareham, 
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) ("A brief must contain some support 
for each contention. [Defendant's] brief totally fails to 
provide any reasons to support [his] contention. . . . We 
therefore must disregard this issue."); State v. Pascoe, 774 P.2d 
512, 514 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[A]ppellant failed to support 
his contention with legal analysis or authority. We therefore, 
decline to rule on it."). Because defendant fails to 
substantively argue his position, the Court has no basis from 
which to evaluate or rule on his contention. 
Should this Court decide to review the merits of 
defendant's argument, governing authority clearly supports the 
trial court's decision to admit the tape recording into evidence. 
In State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme 
Court disposed of a challenge nearly identical to defendant's 
here. In that case, an undercover agent wore a "wire" which 
transmitted her conversations with the defendant during a drug 
transaction to fellow officers stationed outside. The defendant 
challenged the admissibility of the conversations, which were 
taped, on the ground that the police did not first obtain a court 
order authorizing the interception of the conversations. In 
holding that no such court order was necessary, the Court stated 
that "U.C.A., 1953, § 77-23a-4(2)(b) allows the interception of 
wire or oral communication by a person acting under color of law 
'where the person is a party to the communication.'M Ixi. at 759 
(citations omitted). 
In the instant case, Mr. Murphy clearly acting under 
color of law in his capacity under an immunity agreement 
authorized the taping of his phone conversation with defendant 
(R. 113). That tape was properly admitted into evidence. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED DEFENDANT'S 
PROFFERED EVIDENCE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court's exclusion of a 
tape recording was an abuse of discretion and a denial of his 
right to cross examine under the Utah and federal constitutions. 
In making his argument, defendant fails to support his contention 
by any legal analysis or authority. As discussed supra, that 
failure gives this Court no basis from which to evaluate or rule 
on his position, and this Court may decline to address his 
argument. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344. 
Should this Court entertain defendant's argument, 
governing authority supports the trial court's exclusion of 
defendant's proffered evidence pursuant to Utah R. of Evid. 403. 
Here, the trial court denied defendant's motion to admit the 
evidence in question as a "waste of time" and a "needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence under Rule 403" (R. 206). An 
evidentiary ruling under Rule 403 will not be overturned absent 
an abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Larson, 775 
P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989). To constitute an abuse of discretion 
the error must have been harmful. Jd. Errors are labeled 
"harmless" when the appellate court concludes that there was "no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to admit the tape recording in question. Mr. Murphy, 
who spoke on the tape in question testified repeatedly that he 
had done so under duress after having been threatened by 
defendant (R. 123, 138-39). He testified that what he had said 
on the tape was contrary to his testimony at trial and that he 
had lied while speaking on that tape (R. 138, 140). Two other 
witnesses, present at the time the tape was made, testified to 
the fact that Murphy said things on the tape contrary to his in-
court testimony (R. 184, 188). Moreover, an expert from the 
Weber State College crime lab testified that several electrical 
disturbances were in the tape itself and concluded that it was 
highly likely that material had been removed from the tape 
recording (R. 196-97). All witnesses testified before the jury. 
The testimony, as to the tape's content (i.e. contrary to 
Murphy's testimony at trial), the circumstances surrounding the 
tape's preparation, and its inherent unreliability due to 
possible tampering all amply support the trial court's Rule 403 
ruling. Even if the trial court erred in failing to admit the 
tape recording, there is no reasonable likelihood that it in any 
way affected the outcome of the proceedings, 
With regard to defendant's assertions that he was 
denied his constitutional right to cross examine, defendant fully 
cross examined Mr. Murphy at trial, including extensive 
questioning concerning the tape recording in question. No error 
exists. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY CONCERNING THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
IMMUNIZED WITNESS. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing 
to give the following instruction to th€? jury: 
You have heard the testimony that Patrick 
Murphy, received a benefit from the 
government in connection with this case. You 
should examine Patrick Murphy's testimony 
with greater caution than that of ordinary 
witnesses. In evaluating that testimony, you 
should consider the extent to which it may 
have been influenced by the receipt of 
benefits from the government. 
(R. 63). Instead, the trial court gave the following instruction 
(Instruction 14): 
If you believe any witness has willfully 
testified falsely, as to any material fact in 
the case, you are at liberty to disregard the 
whole of the testimony of such witness, 
except as he may have been corroborated by 
other credible witnesses or credible 
evidence. You are not bound to believe all 
that the witnesses may have testified to nor 
are you bound to believe any witness; you may 
believe one witness against many, or many as 
against one. In the light of the above 
observations, it is your privilege to judge 
the weight to be given the testimony of the 
witnesses and to determine what the facts 
are. 
In weighing the testimony of any witnessf 
you may take into consideration their [sic] 
interest in the matter and give their [sic] 
testimony the same fair and impartial 
consideration you are obliged to give to all 
of the evidence in the case. 
(R. 54). 
In support of his position, defendant cites State v. 
Sdhreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986), stating that the Utah 
Supreme Court in that case held that a proper jury instruction 
would state that certain persons had been granted immunity and 
that the jury should view their testimony "with the utmost, 
scrutiny and caution" (Br. of App. at 7). In reality, the 
Court's holding was to the contrary. The jury instruction quoted 
by defendant was the one proposed by the defendant there and 
refused by the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the 
trial court did not err in refusing to give the "utmost scrutiny 
and caution" instruction and stated that "a grant of immunity 
from other crimes does not require a specific instruction that 
the immunized witness's testimony should be viewed with 
suspicion." State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d at 1221. The Court 
also noted with approval the trial court's employment of two more 
general instructions concerning weighing bias, interest and other 
factors in evaluating a witness's testimony. Id. 
While the defendant here has not proposed that the 
immunized witness's testimony be viewed with "suspicion," a 
standard which can be applicable to uncorroborated accomplice 
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testimony, Schreuder, 726 P.2d at 1221 (citing State v. Wood, 648 
P.2d 71, 91 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982)), he has 
requested that "greater caution" be used in the jury's evaluation 
of that testimony. 
In State v. Vaughn, 554 P.2d 210 (Utah 1976), the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the precise issue in dispute here. 
There, the defendant challenged the trial court's failure to give 
jury instructions as to the credibility of a witness who had been 
granted immunity. In upholding the trial court's ruling, the 
Court stated that "generally such instructions are addressed to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, which rule is applicable 
to witnesses generally, including those expecting immunity or 
having been employed to seek out evidence." Id., at 211. As 
noted supra, a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless 
its error is harmful. See State v. Larson, 775 P.2d at 419. 
In the instant case, the trial court gave a general 
instruction informing the jury members that they could take into 
consideration a witness's interest in the matter. That 
instruction alone is adequate. Even if the trial court should 
have used defendant's requested instruction, its failure to do so 
constitutes harmless error. The matter of .Mr. Murphy's interest 
in the case was before the jury due to extensive cross 
examination of Murphy and the police officers involved in the 
matter. Moreover, Murphy testimony was corroborated by three 
police officers, including the Chief of Police of Roosevelt, 
Utah. Defendant offered no testimony or evidence rebutting the 
facts of the transaction in question as testified to by the 
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prosecution witnesses. Even if the trial court erred in failing 
to give defendant's proposed instruction, the error would be 
harmless. There is "no reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d at 120. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons defendant's conviction should 
be affirmed. 
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